Chittagong Port, Bangladesh’s largest maritime hub, is no longer a quiet gateway for trade. Once a symbol of regional commerce and connectivity, it has become the epicentre of strategic manoeuvring in the Bay of Bengal. U.S. transport aircraft, Chinese submarines, and Russian warships are converging here, turning a commercial port into a chessboard of global power. For India, every landing, every dock, and every exercise is a test of its influence, its security, and its readiness to protect its eastern frontier.
The port’s location is what makes it so critical. Just a few hundred kilometres from India’s northeastern states and the Siliguri Corridor, the narrow lifeline known as the Chicken’s Neck connecting mainland India to its seven northeastern states-Chittagong sits at a vantage point over vital shipping lanes, energy transit routes, and maritime chokepoints. Whoever controls influence here can monitor India, track its trade, and potentially threaten the security of its strategic corridors.
U.S. Expansion: Beneath the Humanitarian Veil
In recent months, the U.S. has been steadily increasing its footprint in Bangladesh. C-130J Super Hercules aircraft from the U.S. Air Force have flown into Chittagong, joining Bangladesh and Sri Lankan forces in Pacific Angel 25-3, a multinational exercise framed as “humanitarian aid and disaster response.” On the surface, this appears benign. Beneath the veneer, it is a signal: Washington is positioning itself strategically in India’s neighbourhood, and India cannot afford to ignore it.
At least 242 personnel, including 92 from the U.S. Air Force — participated in the exercise, alongside Bangladesh Air Force and Sri Lankan contingents. Earlier, in July, Tiger Lightning 2025 brought together elite units of Bangladesh’s Para Commando Brigade and the U.S. Army Pacific Command, training in jungle warfare, counter-terrorism, and operational coordination. These exercises are far more than drills; they are the foundations of permanent influence. For India, the implications are clear: air and logistics infrastructure in Chittagong could serve as a forward base for operations that do not always align with Indian interests.
China’s Strategic Footprint
China’s presence complicates the picture further. On 12 October 2024, the Chinese naval training ship Qi Jiguang and amphibious dock landing ship Jinggangshan docked in Chittagong, the first foreign fleet to visit under Bangladesh’s interim government led by Nobel laureate Muhammad Yunus. Beijing’s ambassador emphasised that political shifts in Dhaka would not affect China’s growing influence. For India, the message is stark: China is building infrastructure, forging ties, and embedding its presence right on its doorstep.
The Chinese footprint is now substantive. Beijing has commissioned a submarine base capable of housing two Ming-class submarines, with facilities for research vessels able to map seabed cables and conduct maritime surveillance, vital intelligence for a nation like India, which depends on the Bay of Bengal for trade and energy security. Beyond military hardware, bilateral exercises such as the Golden Friendship drills indicate Beijing is not merely visiting; it is embedding strategy in Bangladesh’s military framework.
Russia: Balancing Act or Added Complexity?
In April 2025, three Russian warships; Admiral Tributs, Admiral Panteleyev, and the tanker Pechenga, docked at Chittagong following a high-level visit to Moscow by Bangladesh’s Army Chief, General SM Shafiuddin Ahmed. Officially a “friendly port call,” it marked the first Russian naval visit in 50 years and signals Dhaka’s intent to diversify its military relationships, balancing China and the U.S.
For India, Russia’s presence is double-edged. On one hand, Moscow has historically been a reliable partner, supporting regional stability and bilateral projects like the Rooppur Nuclear Power Plant. India and Russia have a long history of cooperation in Bangladesh, from the Liberation War in 1971 to energy and defence partnerships today. On the other hand, a growing Russian naval presence in Bangladesh adds a new layer of complexity to New Delhi’s vision of an Indian-led security architecture in the Bay of Bengal.
The Geopolitical Stakes
Why should India be particularly concerned? Geography leaves little margin for error. Chittagong lies less than 200 kilometres from India’s northeastern states and near the Siliguri Corridor. In times of tension, influence over Chittagong could jeopardise India’s critical lines of communication. Proximity to Myanmar, with its insurgencies and refugee flows, further strains India’s borders. Foreign militarisation here is not merely symbolic, it is existential for India’s eastern security.
Chittagong controls access to key maritime routes. Energy imports, naval mobility, and commercial trade through the Bay of Bengal could be monitored or influenced by external powers. For India, U.S. listening posts, Chinese maritime surveillance, and Russian naval logistics are not hypothetical threats; they are real risks to the economy, defence readiness, and the security of its eastern frontier. India’s backyard is increasingly being militarised without its consent.
Bangladesh’s Interim Government: Navigating a Complex Landscape
Sheikh Hasina’s ouster in August 2024, following student-led protests, brought an interim government under Muhammad Yunus. For India, this political shift adds uncertainty. Dhaka appears more willing to accommodate external powers, including China, the U.S., Pakistan, and Turkey, while also allowing Islamist elements to gain influence. Reports suggest Washington was displeased with Hasina for allegedly denying access to St Martin’s Island. China, meanwhile, has acted swiftly to strengthen ties with Yunus. Russia, too, is asserting itself, emphasising diversification rather than bloc alignment.
This complex environment presents both risk and opportunity for India. A weakened or indecisive Bangladesh could become a platform for foreign powers hostile to Indian interests. At the same time, supporting institutions like Bangladesh’s army under Zaman could help preserve law, order, and multipolarity, ensuring Chittagong remains a partner in regional stability rather than a staging ground for external influence.
Strategic Imperatives for India
India cannot afford to be reactive. The rising presence of the U.S. and China in Chittagong, alongside Russian engagement, demands proactive measures:
Strengthen ties with Bangladesh through investment, infrastructure, and defence cooperation. Economic interdependence is a potent lever.
Modernise India’s Northeast, upgrading roads, bridges, and military logistics to ensure rapid mobilisation if required.
Enhance intelligence and maritime monitoring across the Bay of Bengal to anticipate and counter foreign encroachment.
Leverage strategic partnerships with traditional allies and friendly Southeast Asian nations to balance Chinese influence without overdependence.
Beyond security, Chittagong’s militarisation affects trade, energy, and economic growth. India’s eastern ports and maritime commerce depend on free and secure sea lanes. Encroachment by foreign powers jeopardises not only military interests but also the economic lifelines connecting India to Southeast Asia and beyond.
Historical and Moral Stakes
India has historically supported Bangladesh against external interference, promoted democratic governance, and invested in regional development. A failure to assert influence now risks reversing decades of effort, leaving Bangladesh vulnerable to strategic co-optation by powers whose goals may conflict with India’s security and economic interests.
The lessons are clear. From Gwadar to Hambantota and now Chittagong, the “string of pearls” strategy is being realised. For New Delhi, every development in Dhaka’s port city is a reminder: India must assert influence, not passively react.
Chittagong as a Test of India’s Resolve
In the 21st century, geography is destiny. Chittagong is no longer just a port; it is the epicentre of strategic competition in South Asia. India’s ability to respond decisively will determine whether its eastern borders remain secure, whether trade and energy lines remain uninterrupted, and whether its neighbourhood remains aligned with New Delhi’s interests rather than external ambitions.
The choice is stark: act decisively or risk being encircled by foreign powers in its own backyard. The U.S., China, and Russia are already playing their moves. Chittagong is the board; the Bay of Bengal is the arena. India must rise to the challenge — not with rhetoric, but with strategy, infrastructure, and influence.
For India, the question is no longer whether to act. The question is how decisively. The port may belong to Bangladesh, but its significance belongs to India. Its actions today will determine who writes the next chapter in South Asia’s security, stability, and prosperity.
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